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Abstract 
 
Using data of US domestic mergers and acquisitions transactions, this paper shows 
that acquirers have a preference for geographically proximate target companies. We 
measure the ‘home bias’ against benchmark portfolios of hypothetical deals where 
the potential targets consist of firms of similar size in the same four-digit SIC code 
that have been targets in other transactions at about the same time or firms that have 
been listed at a stock exchange at that time. There is a strong and consistent home 
bias for M&A transactions in the US, which is significantly declining during the 
observation period, i.e. between 1990 and 2004. At the same time, the average 
distances between target and acquirer increase articulately. The home bias is 
stronger for small and relatively opaque target companies suggesting that local 
information is the decisive factor in explaining the results. Acquirers that diversify 
into new business lines also display a stronger preference for more proximate 
targets. With an event study we show that investors react relatively better to 
proximate acquisitions than to distant ones. That reaction is more important and 
becomes significant in times when the average distance between target and acquirer 
becomes larger, but never becomes economically significant. We interpret this as 
evidence for the familiarity hypothesis brought forward by Huberman (2001): 
Acquirers know about the existence of proximate targets and are more likely to 
merge with them without necessarily being better informed. However, when 
comparing the best and the worst deals, we are able to show a dramatic difference in 
distances and home bias: The most successful deals display on average a much 
stronger home bias and distinctively smaller distance between acquirer and target 
than the least successful deals. Proximity in M&A transactions therefore is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for success. The paper contributes to the 
growing literature on the role of distance in financial decisions. 
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Introduction 
There is growing evidence that spatial distance to investment objects is influencing 
financial decisions of various types. This paper shows that in mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) transactions acquirers have a preference for geographically proximate 
target companies even in domestic transactions. We use US domestic M&A data 
from 1990 to 2004 and construct a portfolio of possible alternative targets for each 
observed deal. With an average headquarter to headquarter distance to all possible 
targets of 1764 kilometers, the average distance to the chosen target is only 1209 
kilometers. This effect is stronger for small and otherwise opaque targets and for 
firms that are active in different industries than the buyer. Despite a lack of economic 
relevance for the whole sample, distance plays a role for the success of M&A transac-
tions: The best decile of M&A-deals in terms of capital market reactions for buyers 
and targets combined in a three-day window around announcement date displays sig-
nificantly less distance between acquirer and target: An average abnormal return of 
13.6% is associated with a median distance of 588 kilometers. This stands in stark 
contrast to the worst decile, where the average deal has an abnormal return of -11.6% 
while the sample displays a median distance of 1412 kilometers. There are at least 
four theoretical arguments that back this finding. First, lower transportation and inte-
gration costs occur when firms merge with other firms close by. Second, monitoring 
costs for the newly acquired firm after the transaction might be lower for acquirers 
which acquire firms close by. Third, firms may buy targets close by to build up local 
monopoly power and thus become able to raise prices and therefore profits. Fourth, 
firms might have better information about geographically proximate targets and/or 
are better able to assess the potential and risk of such a transaction. The latter might 
point to capital market imperfections that persist even when transactions are exe-
cuted in a time-span of months. For stock trading (Hau 2001) and analysis (Malloy 
2005) the physical distance to the respective headquarters plays a decisive role for the 
success for the traders and analysts, respectively. The influence of spatial distance on 
M&A deals is also relevant for judging the achievable degree of integration of capital   2
markets, especially in the European Union. The benchmark market – the US – is 
showing a spatially biased development, so a perfectly homogeneous spatial distribu-
tion of M&A activity should not be expected even in the long run in Europe. 
The international home bias in equity holdings and investment is a long known styl-
ized fact (see Lewis 1999 for an overview) which holds true also for corporate bonds 
(Portes et al. 2001). Informational advantages have been identified as main drivers of 
the international home bias (Gehrig 1993; Dvorák 2005; Ahearne et al. 2004; Strong 
and Xu 2003; Chan et al. 2005). Geographical proximity also explains listing decisions 
of firms internationally (Pagano et al. 2002; Sarkissian and Schill 2004). 
There is mixed theoretical evidence for a propensity of firms to locate foreign direct 
investments (FDI) in proximate countries.
1 Horizontal FDI is usually seen as substi-
tuting exports. The higher the transport costs, increasing with distance, the less ad-
vantageous the export and the more horizontal FDI could be expected. Thus, hori-
zontal FDI should increase with distance. However, vertical FDI, fragmenting the 
production process geographically, should be discouraged with increasing distance 
due to the increasing transportation costs of intermediate products (Loungani et al. 
2002). Data on FDI is usually a mix of horizontal and vertical FDI, so the a priori 
impact of distance remains uncertain. In empirical studies, companies that pursue 
foreign direct investments – i.e., mostly international M&A – generally prefer host 
countries that are close to their headquarters (see Shatz and Venables 2000 for an 
overview; Berger et al. 2004 for financial institutions). Much of this home bias in for-
eign direct investment has been attributed to transportation costs and recently to in-
formation asymmetries and the costs of overcoming these. However, in an interna-
tional context, information costs also occur because of differences in language, regu-
lation, currency, culture and legal systems. The effect of distance itself is hard to ex-
tract since, e.g., culture and regulatory differences are almost impossible to quantify 
(see Berger et al. 2000; Buch and DeLong 2004). But not all home bias is related to 
the international economy (Coval and Moskowitz 1999). This paper focuses on do-
                                                 
1 On average 72 percent of all FDI take place in the form of ‚brown-field’ FDI, i.e. mergers and acquisitions. 
Between developed countries this figures reaches 84 percent and into developing countries 41 percent (UNC-
TAD 2003).    3
mestic transactions and examines whether acquirers have a preference for geographi-
cally proximate target companies within one country. We concentrate on US acquir-
ing firms and domestic transactions, i.e. on a setting with a single currency, language 
and little variety in regulation, taxation, political risk and culture. This analysis there-
fore allows for the separation of the distance effect from other possible influences 
and gives hints on the role of pure distance in international transactions. 
The problem with stating a home bias in M&A transactions is the fact that most eco-
nomic activity is far from evenly distributed in space but clustered in a few areas (see 
Ellison and Glaeser 1997 and Krugman 1991 for the US; Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 
2000 for the EU): A Silicon Valley-based software firm that buys another software 
firm close by may just have few other choices because of the high degree of agglom-
eration of software firms. A bias in equity holdings usually is measured by comparing 
an observed portfolio with the market portfolio and computing the respective dis-
tances. Looking at M&A transactions, there is no obvious portfolio but only one ob-
served deal and there is no market portfolio – so how to analyze whether there is a 
tendency for firms to merge with other firms close by? We construct a hypothetical 
portfolio of potential targets for each observed deal and compare the average dis-
tance to this portfolio with the distance (and other characteristics) to the observed 
deal. The potential targets in the hypothetical portfolio are firms in the same industry 
with about the same size that have been listed at a stock exchange or have been tar-
gets in other deals at the time the observed deal took place. Thus, we are able to ana-
lyze whether acquiring firms pick their targets closer to them than the average poten-
tial target or otherwise, i.e. if there is a home bias in M&A transactions or not. We 
show that in domestic transactions there is a strong preference for local mergers and 
acquisitions. Even when controlling for a variety of other characteristics, we find a 
significant home bias in the transactions. Combined abnormal returns for buyer and 
seller in a three-day window around announcement date are significantly higher for 
transactions that take place in short distance to each other, although it is not eco-
nomically relevant in the whole sample. A look at the most and least successful deals, 
however, reveals strong discrepancies in the average distances between acquirer and   4
target. Our findings underline the importance of the emerging research area of geo-
graphically asymmetric distribution of information in capital market theory.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next chapter displays data and the 
methodology used for this study. In chapter two we use a binary regression approach 
to show what the main target characteristics are that drive the decision to merge with 
a specific target. Chapter three describes a model for measuring proximity preference, 
i.e. the home bias. In chapter four we explain the extent of the home bias by regress-
ing the results on variables identified in the literature and associated with asymmetric 
information. Chapter five hosts an event study of capital market reactions to merger 
announcements with respect to the home bias of an acquirer. Chapter six concludes. 
I. Methodology 
A. Background and Motivation  
There is barely another financial decision which covers a longer time span than the 
decision to buy another firm, and in which more professionals are involved. Finding 
a home bias would add substantially to the literature on the influence of distance in 
financial decisions. M&A transactions usually take at least several months from the 
inception of the strategy to completing the transaction. It is the decision of the senior 
management of the acquirer, involving investment banks conducting a thorough 
search for and selection of the target company. It could be expected that firms would 
benefit by evaluating the broadest possible set of potential targets. A home bias based 
on information asymmetries means that firms might forego possible gains when not 
choosing the optimal target. At least four arguments underline the notion of firms 
buying other firms nearby. First are transport and transaction costs when integrating 
and running the combined firm. Integration usually involves senior management to a 
large extent but also exchange of goods and workers at all levels. Traveling back and 
forth is not only more costly, the larger the distance between the two firms but also 
more time-consuming. This transport cost effect is visible even at a very small scale 
in discriminatory pricing in loans (Degryse and Ongena 2005).   5
Second, it might be more difficult to monitor affiliations that are far away – local 
managers might find it easier to pursue their own goals instead of those given by the 
headquarters. Böckerman and Lehto (2003) find evidence for the monitoring hy-
pothesis as a driver of proximate mergers in Finnish data. This is in line with the ob-
servation that venture capital firms invest predominantly in firms close to them 
(Lerner 1995; Zook 2002, Sorenson and Stuart 2001) and with Denis et al. (2002) 
who find an internationalization discount for listed firms, attributing this to agency 
costs that increase with distance and international borders.  
The third argument is about local monopolies. When merging with a similar firm in 
the same industry nearby, local competition will become weaker and therefore the 
possibility to raise prices and profits increases. The more local the demand, the 
stronger the effect will occur. When building local monopolies is a strong factor in 
buying proximate targets one should observe a stronger home bias when acquirer and 
target are operating in the same industry and less home bias in diversifying acquisi-
tions. However, when the industry of the acquirer is already concentrated locally, ac-
quirers looking for an acquisition might be forced by the (local) antitrust authorities 
to look elsewhere when acquiring firms in the same industry. The latter argument 
however, would imply that industries with predominantly regional markets would 
yield other results than industries with predominantly national markets. When break-
ing up the following analyses into sub-samples of single industries, no clear pattern 
like that emerges. Industries with national markets (e.g., software packaging) display 
qualitatively the same results as others. Additionally, local concentration might be 
more an issue on the plant or shop-level, which are not regarded here, than on the 
headquarters level. 
The fourth argument evolves around the well-documented ‘soft information’ that is 
available only in spatial proximity to one another. When the insufficiency of informa-
tion – that increases with distance about potential targets – is a relevant source of 
home bias in M&A decisions, acquirers forego potential profits in finding the best 
possible deal. Earlier studies found a domestic home bias in other financial transac-
tions usually involving stronger effects in very short-term actions. In his study on the 
profitability of stock trading that takes place close to the headquarters of the traded   6
firms, Hau (2001) finds that distance matters most for trading at high frequencies. 
Long and medium frequency trading yielded no extra profits for being proximate to 
the respective headquarters when compared with other traders located in the same 
country. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) study the behavior of mutual fund managers in 
the US that prefer to hold locally headquartered firms and find a strong bias for in-
vestments that are close to the location of the fund manager. Investments in large 
firms tend to be further away than those in small firms. Fund managers that display a 
strong home bias achieve higher risk-adjusted returns when investing in those firms 
nearby (Coval and Moskowitz 2001). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) show that in-
vestors in Finland prefer stocks of firms that are headquartered in spatially close loca-
tions to those that are farther away. Furthermore, Finnish-speaking investors prefer 
Finnish companies that publish their results in Finnish; Swedish-speaking investors 
prefer companies that publish in Swedish. (Finland is a bilingual country, with Fin-
nish and Swedish as the two official languages.) Their data reveals as well that there is 
a tendency for households to hold stocks of firms whose CEO is of the same cultural 
(i.e. Finnish or Swedish, respectively) origin. The influence of distance, language and 
‘culture’ is smaller, the savvier investors are. Huberman (2001) and Zhu (2002) report 
similar results for individual investors in the US. Much in line with the argument pre-
sented in this paper, Malloy (2005) analyses the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts with 
regard to their spatial distance to the respective headquarters of the covered firms. 
He finds that being close the headquarters significantly increases analysts forecast ac-
curacy. The effect is stronger for small or otherwise opaque firms, such as fast-
growing firms or firms in remote locations. Not related to investment decisions but 
in a somewhat similar research, Berger et al. (2000) compare bank efficiency and do 
not find any disadvantages for domestic US banks operating in regions where they 
are not headquartered (in fact, they find a slight advantage for those banks in terms 
of cost efficiency). They conclude that physical distance itself does not matter a lot. 
In close proximity to a firm there is more information available than from a distance. 
This is because people can talk to managers and employees as well as suppliers and 
clients of the firm, who give (tacit) information which is not easily transferable over 
distance, e.g. mood, non quantifiable feelings about the future, etc. (Coval and   7
Moskowitz 1999; see Polanyi 1958). Also, investors get some information locally 
without having to ask for it, by just bumping into people and chatting with them 
(valuable noise). Since face-to-face contact is still the best ‘communication technol-
ogy’ (Storper and Venables 2004), being close to one another delivers more, richer 
and faster information than otherwise. However, physical distance per se does not 
solely drive either information asymmetries or transportation and integration costs.  
Much information is remotely available, e.g. on the internet, since the mid-1990s that 
was not readily available before. Petersen and Rajan (2002) report that banks’ average 
distance to lenders has increased over time. Today, Internet information does not 
only comprise the official company website but also information from clients in 
blogs or news fora and occasionally reports from employees – in short, much infor-
mation that would seem local before. We analyze the development of the home bias 
in M&A transactions over time to see whether information technology has an impact 
and additionally split our data into two subsets, up to 1996 and thereafter, to analyze 
whether the success of deals has been changed over time.  
Analyzing the home bias for individual investors, Huberman (2001) and Zhu (2002) 
show that investors in companies close by do not achieve superior results in com-
parison to more distant investors. They conclude that it is not better information that 
drives investments into these companies but familiarity. In contrast, Malloy (2005) 
finds that analysts do have more impact and better forecasts for companies close to 
them; Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find fund managers to have extraordinary returns 
when investing in local companies. That suggests that professionals in the financial 
industry are able to gain from superior (tacit) information close to the firms whereas 
individuals just invest in what they are familiar with without profiting from that. For 
international equity flows, it is also not clear whether it is familiarity or behavioral ex-
planations that drives investment flows in capital markets (see Portes and Rey 2005). 
Since many M&A decisions are not yielding profits for the acquirer (see Andrade et 
al. 2001 for an overview) we are interested in whether a domestic home bias in M&A 
is driven by familiarity or superior information.  
   8
B. Data 
Our sample merges several data sets. The primary data source is the Thomson ONE 
Banker-Deals database, which lists M&A transactions worldwide. Our sample con-
sists of mergers and acquisitions with an effective transaction date from the begin-
ning of 1990 until the first quarter of 2004 where both, acquirer and target, are lo-
cated in the US. We exclude Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and count the District 
of Columbia as a state; however, robustness checks including Alaska and Hawaii did 
not alter the results qualitatively. Only those transactions are included where more 
than 50% of all shares are acquired as well as the location of both, acquirer and tar-
get, is known. A total of 46,522 transactions match these criteria. Data about listed 
firms – targets as well as potential targets – are taken from S&P‘s COMPUSTAT. 
For firms that have been listed on a stock exchange but were not actually acquired we 
use a proxy.  As the potential deal volume we take the yearly average market value in 
the year before the deal took place from COMPUSTAT`s Research Insight database 
plus a premium. M&A activity concentrates to a large extent only in few industries, 
and there might be differences between industries in the home bias. A breakdown of 
the observations of the most important industries is reported in figure 1.  
Figure 1 
Most important industries  
by observation count 
This table shows a breakdown of the most 
important industries by M&A activity. The 
top ranking industries are dominated by IT 
and financial services. 
SIC count avg. Distance
7372 2892 1567.06
7375 1332 1441.99
6021 1230 375.73
6022 1198 344.14
6035 1062 345.59
6512 1046 969.97
7389 809 1401.79
7373 678 1522.51
7011 641 1320.24
4813 622 1211.03
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To control for potential changes in time we split the dataset in two sub-samples, 
from 1990 to 1996 – i.e. roughly before the internet became ubiquitous – and from 
1997 to 2004. The amount of information available for each deal varies considerably. 
Most information is available for the roughly 14,000 listed companies recorded in 
COMPUSTAT. In private deals, often only the names of the companies are re-
corded, for a mere 34,513 deals the transaction volume is known. The majority of 
targets are private companies, i.e. 59.1 percent or 27488 out of 46,522. The reverse is 
true for acquirers, where only 42.7 percent (19887) are private.  
We match the location of primary business – i.e. the location of the headquarters – of 
target and acquirer with longitude and latitude data using the US Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer reference data. We do not use the state of incorporation for measuring dis-
tances because firms choose their incorporation because of tax, bankruptcy or take-
over law without necessarily having any physical presence in that state. Most firms 
are either located in their home state or in Delaware (Bebchuk and Cohen 2003). For 
listed firms, we calculate abnormal returns around announcement date using Center 
for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) data. Following the literature, we calculate 
the returns on a [-1; 1] event window around announcement date (see Andrade et al. 
2001).  
The spatial distribution of acquirers and targets is shown in figure 2 below. Not sur-
prisingly, the pattern follows very closely that of general economic activity. Most 
deals take place along the coast lines and in the large cities. The map shows graphi-
cally that acquirers tend to be more concentrated than the targets. To confirm the 
impression from the map we construct a simple locational Herfindahl-Index (LHI) 
that measures the locational concentration of acquirers and targets respectively: 
∑
=
=
n
1 i
2
i s LHI  
Where n is the number of cities in which targets (acquirers) are located and si the 
number of targets (acquirers) in city i divided by the total number of targets (acquir-
ers) in the sample. The resulting LHI – which theoretically could run from zero to   10
10000 – is clearly confirming the impression of a stronger concentration of acquirers 
in the map (the same pattern holds true for value-weighted LHI). Since most targets 
are distinctly smaller than their acquirers, the combined firms might concentrate their 
headquarters and thus their economic decision making power at the location of the 
acquirers’ headquarters, which are predominantly located in large cities. This observa-
tion is in line with the findings by Green (1990) and Rodríguez-Pose and Zademach 
(2003) for the US until the 1990 and Germany until 1999, respectively. 
 Figure 2 
Spatial distribution of acquirers and targets 
The spatial distribution of acquirers and targets is shown in the figure below. Not surprisingly, the pattern follows very 
closely that of general economic activity, with most deals concentrating at the coasts and the large cities. The map shows 
graphically that acquirers tend to be more concentrated than the targets. To confirm the impression from the map we con-
struct a simple locational Herfindahl-Index (LHI) that measures the locational concentration of acquirers and targets re-
spectively. 
 
 
 
Δ = acquirer 
Δ = targets 
LHI acquirers = 91.0 
LHI targets = 54.2   11
We are, however, more interested in the distance between target and acquirer than in 
their actual location. Distances between the acquirer’s and the target’s headquarters 
are calculated with IBM’s DB2 Spatial Extender using the arc length between the two 
locations in kilometers (see Coval and Moskowitz 1999 for details). We use the dis-
tance between headquarters because this is where the decision makers are located, 
which is of pre-eminent interest for us. Since most targets are comparatively small 
firms that have only few – if any – other locations than their respective headquarters, 
we do not think this poses a problem for the generality of our findings. While it is 
true that for some firms, e.g. co-location of some plants of acquirer and target might 
lead to better respective knowledge about each other, interviews with industry spe-
cialists and decision makers in large firms indicate that managers at the plant level are 
usually not involved in the decision of which firm to merge. They are involved in the 
integration phase that is, however, usually quite separated from the decision and 
transaction phase. Figure 3 displays the frequency of transactions at varying distances. 
 Figure 3 
Frequency distribution of target-acquirer distance TAD 
This histogram shows the frequencies of distances between target and acquirer TAD. 
The most stunning feature of this frequency distribution is the prevalence of transac-
tions that take place within a 100 kilometers distance between acquirer and target; about 
one quarter (24.6%) of all acquirers choose targets within that radius. Over 11 percent 
of the transactions in our sample are carried out within the same city. 
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The most stunning feature of this frequency distribution is the prevalence of transac-
tions that take place within a 100 kilometers distance between acquirer and target; 
about one quarter (24.6%) of all acquirers choose targets within that radius. Over 11 
percent of the transactions in our sample are carried out within the same city. The 
more distance between the two firms, the less transactions occur. There is a small but 
noticeable exemption around 4,000 km, the distance between the two coasts. The av-
erage distance between acquirer and target is 1,209 km; the median deal has a dis-
tance of 825 km.  
II. Distance and the decision to acquire 
The findings above impose the idea of a distinctive proximity preference in M&A 
transactions. But if the acquirer simply did not have the opportunity to buy a more 
distant firm, a proximity preference does not exist: It could just be a product of clus-
tered economic activity and industries in space. Hence, we identify a peer company 
for every chosen target to examine whether distance plays a role in the acquirer’s de-
cision making process and perform a matched pair analysis. For being eligible as a 
hypothetical target, firms have to fulfill several requirements to account for the fea-
tures of M&A transactions: First, acquirers do not look around for firms randomly. 
While some large firms occasionally might buy ‘a bargain’ in any industry, this is not 
the standard practice. We assume that acquirers search for firms in specific industries 
to complement their production portfolio and accordingly base our peer companies 
on industry specification. A hypothetical target has to be active in the same industry 
(at the 4-digit SIC level) as the observed target. Although none two firms are the 
same and acquirers might go for one special firm that possess specific resources, we 
assume that any firm operating in the same industry would be a possible target as 
well. Given the usual scanning process in M&A transactions, this seems to be a rea-
sonable assumption. 
Using a firm as a hypothetical target is only justified when there is the possibility of 
buying it at a market price: To fulfill the second requirement, firms have to be either   13
listed on a stock exchange at the time the transaction took place, assuming that all 
listed firms are actually able for sale. Or it has to have been a target in another M&A 
transaction at around the same time the observed deal took place. Thus, we are able 
to include all the private firms that have been bought in M&A transactions and so 
would have been available as possible targets for the acquirer in the observed deal. 
We might miss firms that the owners were willing to sell but could not find a buyer at 
the asked price. Since this condition might possibly hold true for each and every firm 
at all times, we treat those firms as if they have not been on the market at all. Al-
though acquirers’ decision-making processes are heterogeneous and it is hard to pin 
down exactly how long an acquirer will search for an eligible target, practitioners state 
that a typical pro-active acquisition process will last about six to twelve months, with 
the strategic decision taken typically less than a year before the process starts. There-
fore we include a firm that has been a target in another deal in the hypothetical port-
folio when it has been a target up to 18 months in advance to the observed deal, as it 
could have been potentially bought by the acquirer. Also firms that have been targets 
up to 18 months after the observed deal took place are included, since we assume 
that these firms were ‘on the market' at the time of the deal.  
Finally, we include only firms of similar value, assuming that acquirers are not look-
ing for firms of very different sizes because of financing constraints, strategic reasons 
and integration strategy. We consider firms that have been a target in other transac-
tions with a known transaction volume to be about the same price when they were 
sold in the range of +/- 20 percent around the price of the observed target. For cal-
culating the range of possible values for listed firms, we include an average acquisi-
tion premium of 20 percent in our calculations. We thereby follow our findings from 
the event study reported in chapter V.2 As a robustness check we also calculated the 
portfolios using the target’s average market capitalization in the year preceding the 
transaction, i.e. without any takeover premium; that left our results qualitatively un-
changed. In what follows only the results for the 20% premium are reported.  
                                                 
2 This is about half the value Gondhalekar et al. (2004) implicitly report in their study of cash offers for targets 
listed on NASDAQ between 1990 and 1999 with a premium of 41.6 percent (own calculation). Since these are 
cash offers, this marks the upper level of premiums.   14
Given these constraints we get a portfolio of eligible target companies for each trans-
action. To identify the best matching peer company for every actual target we choose 
the closest firm according to the following algorithm: First, we create a volume ratio 
to compare the size of the actual target with the size of the potential target. We con-
sider only transactions in which at least 50 percent of the shares are acquired. To 
match the firm values accordingly in cases when less than 100 percent of the shares 
are acquired, we have to normalize the value of potential targets. (In the vast majority 
of cases, more than 90 percent are acquired, so the effect is not large.) We normalize 
the potential target’s transaction volume tv j by dividing it by the percentage of shares 
acquired in that deal paj [0.5 < paj ≤ 1]; and doing the same for the actual target in the 
denominator (tvi/pai). As mentioned above, for listed companies we divide the market 
value mv j plus a premium of 20 percent by the normalized actual target’s value. The 
volume ratio shows the relative deviation from the normalized potential target’s value 
to the normalized actual target’s value: 
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According to our definition of what constitutes a potential target, volume ratio has a 
value from [0.8; 1.2]. A volume ratio of one reflects identical values of actual and po-
tential target. As a second measure we calculate the time difference in days between 
the actual transaction date dt i and the date the potential target has been sold, dp j. We 
assume that listed companies are available all the time, so for them dpj equals dti, i.e. 
day difference is zero. 
j i j i, dp dt difference day  − =    15
To combine these two measures of similarity between each potential target and the 
actual target, we normalize each of them with respect to their maximum deviation, 
i.e. 20% in value terms or 540 days (18 months) in availability. We create a matching 
index MXi,,j for every hypothetically target j which is defined as follows: 
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Both arguments have possible values from zero to one. We simply add the values of 
the arguments to derive the matching index. Among the alternative possible targets 
for each transaction the one with the smallest MXi, j value is chosen as the peer. 
Thus we obtain a model of matched pairs where every actual transaction has one po-
tential transaction assigned. We estimate a logit regression on a dummy variable 
which is one when the target was chosen and zero otherwise. To cope with hetero-
scedasticity we use quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors in the data to estimate 
the regression coefficients. For our analysis we include the potential-target-acquirer-
distance PTAD as explaining variable as well as further control variables consisting of 
target characteristics. These characteristics are specified as follows. The first four re-
gressors are the same as in Kang and Stulz (1997) as well as Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999): the target’s financial leverage (as ratio of total liabilities to total assets), the 
firm size (as the log of the target’s value ln(MV)), the return-on-assets RoA and the 
price-to-book ratio P/B. Thus, the model takes the form: 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = 0 4 3 2 1 P/B RoA Leverage PTAD Yes/No   deal   actual  
The target’s market value MV serves as a proxy for the size of the company. In anal-
ogy to Kang and Stulz (1997) as well as Coval and Moskowitz (1999) we use the log 
of the market value. This has two reasons: First it helps to differentiate small com-
pany sizes more distinctively as they are the majority of M&A transactions in our 
sample. Second, the relationship between firm size and information availability is not 
linear: The availability of information about a certain company (e.g. due to account-
ing regulations, pressure by public interest, etc.) can be assumed to improve with ris-
ing company size, but the slope of this information-size-function cannot be infinitely   16
positive. With the next regressor we add the target’s leverage. The leverage shows the 
target’s financial distress. This can be one reason of selling the company. For the ac-
quirer a high leverage is a two-way indicator: On the one hand the leverage can show 
increased risk in operations. On the other hand it acts as an indicator for a higher re-
turn on equity. As Coval and Moskowitz (2001) put it: ‘The significance of the lever-
age variable is most likely accounted for by its association with future returns’ uncer-
tainty’ (Coval and Moskowitz 2001, p 2067). Informed investors might have larger 
holdings in highly levered firms than less informed investors.  
The third variable is the return-on-assets ratio. RoA gives an idea of the target’s prof-
itability as well as its accounting performance (see Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2063). 
This analysis of the entire US market could be biased by industry specific variations. 
Since we perform a matched pair analysis only with peers that are in the same four-
digit SIC industry, we do not account for industry-specific levels of either RoA or 
P/B. The price-to-book ratio P/B can be interpreted as indicator for potential growth 
of the target. However, a small P/B can signal either a capital market's underestima-
tion or severe distress of the company (see Coval and Moskowitz 1999, p 2063, and 
Fama and French 1992). 
In our sample information on these variables is available only for 874 transactions 
and their peers. That group has an equally distributed response variable, i.e. an equal 
amount of zeros and ones. The distribution of actual transactions (binary variable 
equals one) has a mean target-acquirer-distance of 1078 km with a median of 473 km. 
In contrast, the distribution of hypothetical transactions (binary variable equals zero) 
has a mean potential acquirer-target distance PTAD of 1607 km with a median of 
1158 km. In this sample nearly two thirds (65 percent) of all matched pairs have a 
peer firm that is further away than the actual target. Figure 4 shows the regression re-
sults. The full sample is divided into sub-samples for different firm sizes. The small-
est category builds the nano caps with a market capitalization of up to 50 million US 
dollars. The second frame contains the micro caps with at least 50 to 300 million and 
is followed by the small caps with up to 2 billion dollars. The second largest category 
includes the mid caps with a market capitalization between 2 and 10 billion dollars. 
As the last category the large caps embrace enterprises of up to 200 billion dollars.   17
After the firm size characteristics we distinguish transactions that take place within 
one industry (SICacquirer = SICtarget) from deals where the target constitutes a new busi-
ness line for the acquirer (SICacquirer ≠ SICtarget). 
Figure 4 
Matched pair logit regression (firm characteristics) 
This logit regression’s dependent variable takes the value of one for accomplished transactions and the value 
of zero for hypothetical transactions. The sample consists of matched pairs each having one actual (1) and 
one potential target (0). A match is defined by the potential target with the smallest MX index value which 
consists of the differences in availability and transaction value. To lower the number of digits PTAD is 
measured in thousand kilometers. 
Sample PTAD* Lev RoA P/B C n
All -0.322 -0.218 0.00050 0.00514 0.543 1748
-(8.03) -(1.28) (0.47) (1.35) (4.01)
Nano Cap -0.477 -0.787 -0.00584 0.05910 1.986 244
-(3.98) -(1.29) -(1.48) (0.56) (3.60)
Micro Cap -0.413 -2.138 0.00287 0.07334 2.648 572
-(5.26) -(4.81) (0.70) (1.24) (6.37)
Small Cap -0.284 -1.344 0.01213 0.00427 2.208 314
-(3.20) -(2.68) (1.08) (0.74) 5.42
Mid Cap -0.476 -2.585 0.07578 0.02288 3.032 84
-(2.47) -(1.72) (2.16) (0.53) 2.19
SIC = SIC -0.249 -0.124 0.0000249 0.00429 0.389 1004
-(4.84) -(0.57) (0.02) (1.33) (2.30)
SIC ≠ SIC -0.437 -0.392 0.00187 0.01398 0.783 744
-(6.68) -(1.42) (0.98) (1.66) (3.47)
* in thousand kilometers
 
 
The results in figure 4 show that the distance between acquirer and target PTAD has 
a significant negative impact on the propensity of choosing the target. A more quan-
titative interpretation can be done by taking the antilog of the coefficient. With a 
βPTAD = -0.32 we obtain the odds of e -0.32= 0.7261. This suggests that for an increase 
in distance of one thousand kilometers the probability (odds) of choosing a target de-
creases by 27.4 percent. Like Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b) we regressed with OLS   18
for a robustness check; this delivers similar results (not reported). With rising target 
size the influence of distance remains stable.  
As expected, the leverage coefficient has a negative but not consistently significant 
impact on the decision of an investor to acquire a company. Since leverage is defined 
between zero and one, the coefficient is hard to interpret. The lack of significance is 
not surprising as there are two effects in financial leverage that are contrary to each 
other: Less risk-averse acquirers might seek high equity returns in highly levered 
firms whereas a risk-averse acquirer would hesitate to invest. The RoA’s coefficient is 
not significance except for the Mid Cap sector, whereas the P/B ratio, the second in-
dustry-specific variable, has a positive sign. This may reflect that, over all, the market 
assesses the target in the same way the acquirer does. One possible explanation for 
short distance M&A could be that the majority of transactions merge for local mo-
nopoly. On the contrary, we see a stronger negative impact in inter-industry transac-
tions which we will investigate in the following chapter.  
As for a provisional result we conclude that distance seems to play a decisive role in 
M&A. But further questions arise. After identifying some impact of distance, is there 
a spatial distortion or rather a proximity preference? How can we quantify this prox-
imity preference, as the mere distance reveals no relative measurement?  
III. Home bias 
The logit regression in the last chapter shows that acquirers actually prefer targets 
close by. Because accounting information for non-listed firms is barely available in 
the databases, the analysis was based on less than 1000 observations only; a large ma-
jority of the actual and hypothetical targets are listed on a stock exchange. The results 
could be biased since the location of listed firms might be influenced by industry ag-
glomeration effects and clustering. Also, the majority of deals involves private firms, 
which is not reflected in the sample above. Lastly, a home bias is usually established 
by comparing the observed portfolio against a market portfolio. That market portfo-  19
lio might be the global market portfolio as in many home country bias studies (see 
Lewis 1999 for a survey) or a global free-float portfolio to control for institutional 
shareholdings in the different countries (Dahlquist et al. 2003). In domestic studies, 
this is usually a portfolio of all listed companies, often weighted by market capitaliza-
tion (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 1999). The average distances to the firms in the 
market portfolio are computed and compared to the average distances to the firms in 
the observed portfolio of the investors or analysts. A home bias is constituted when 
the distance to the observed portfolio is smaller than the distance to the market port-
folio. Huberman (2001) uses a subset of the market portfolio, i.e. the seven Regional 
Bell Operating Companies in the US, and shows that individual investors prefer to 
buy shares of their respective local providers.  
A. Analyzing a home bias without a market portfolio 
When looking at M&A transactions, there is no observable portfolio but only sepa-
rate deals. In order to analyze whether there is a home bias, the distance between ac-
quirer and target in each deal will be compared with the average distance to a ‘portfo-
lio’ of possible targets. There is, however, no obvious market portfolio. To create this 
benchmark we expand the idea of matched pairs and construct an entire portfolio of 
hypothetical target firms for every acquirer. We use the same conditions to select hy-
pothetical targets as in the binary regression before, i.e. firms have to be in the same 
industry (4-digit SIC), either listed at that time or being target in another M&A trans-
action from 18 months before to 18 months after the observed transaction took 
place and roughly about the same size (same restrictions as before) as the actual tar-
get. Now we are not narrowing down each sample to only one peer but include all 
firms that match these conditions in a portfolio of potential deals for each transac-
tion. 
We compare the distance between the headquarters of acquirer and target in the ob-
served deal with the average distance between acquirer’s headquarters and all possible 
targets’ headquarters in the portfolio. Since by definition all the companies in the 
portfolio were traded for about the same value, there is no need for controlling for 
company size. The portfolios also reflect the fact that industries are clustered in few   20
areas: An advertising firm from New York that is buying another advertising firm in 
New York might not display a large home bias, since most other advertising firms in 
the portfolio are also New York-based. 
With the restrictions mentioned above there is at least one potential target available 
for more than 15,000 transactions. This results in a minimum portfolio size of two, 
since the actual target is included in the portfolio as well. Figure 5 displays the distri-
bution of hypothetical portfolio sizes over time and industries. The SIC codes of the 
twenty most active industries are shown in the left half of figure 5, together with their 
average portfolio sizes and the number of observations per industry, i.e. the number 
of deals where at least one hypothetical deal has been identified. The right side of 
figure 5 displays the distribution of the average portfolio over time.  
Figure 5 
Average portfolio sizes over time and per industry 
The left table shows the average portfolio size of the 20 most active industries. On the right side 
the average portfolio size per year is shown. Obs represents the number of transactions with a 
portfolio size of at least two potential targets, i.e. one observed and one hypothetical target. 
SIC avg. Portfolio size obs Year avg. Portfolio size obs
6512 34.62 784 1990 4.25 115
7372 34.37 1379 1991 4.94 329
6022 21.49 751 1992 5.99 572
7011 20.05 418 1993 7.37 831
6035 16.36 511 1994 9.34 1082
6021 15.99 758 1995 10.11 1255
7375 13.46 451 1996 11.58 1420
7373 12.88 319 1997 14.95 1764
4832 10.53 313 1998 16.77 1902
1311 9.32 369 1999 14.62 1444
7389 8.45 234 2000 15.10 1356
4813 7.54 319 2001 13.65 880
7371 7.00 214 2002 11.57 709
6311 6.35 197 2003 10.28 621
7379 5.33 163 2004* 9.90 210
8742 4.82 114
8011 4.52 136 * first quarter only
6162 3.90 94
8748 3.78 82
6411 3.77 81
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Not surprisingly, the years with highest M&A activity – in the late nineties and the 
first years in the new century – display the highest average portfolio sizes. 
B. The evidence 
We calculate the home bias variable HBi of each deal i as the difference in kilometers 
between the average distance to all (ni-1) hypothetical targets j of the portfolio i 
(PTADi,j) in the portfolio plus the distance to the actual target on the one side and 
the actual distance between acquirer and target (TADi) on the other: 
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With this specification, HBi gives information about spatial proximity for every M&A 
transaction. A positive value for HBi means that the actual target is closer to the ac-
quirer than the average of possible targets, i.e. the acquirer displays a home bias. 
Negative values occur when the realized target is farther away from the buyer than 
the average hypothetical target. Summarizing all the deals, we would expect a mean 
value of zero when the choice of the buyer is spatially indifferent. Figure 6 shows the 
frequency distribution of HBi for a portfolio size of more than 30 targets, i.e. 29 po-
tential targets and the actual target.    22
Figure 6 
Frequency distribution of home bias 
This figure shows the frequency distribution of the home bias HBi for all domestic 
M&A transactions without AK, HI and PR at a portfolio size of a minimum of 29+1 
targets. Positive values represent a preference for proximate and negative values a pref-
erence for distant targets.  
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The frequency distribution has an asymmetrical shape with a mean home bias of 674 
kilometers: On average, acquirers choose targets that are 674 kilometers closer than 
the average distance to all potential targets in the portfolio. The median takes a value 
of 995 kilometers – half of the acquirers select a target that is at least 995 kilometers 
closer to them than the average distance to their hypothetical portfolio. Including the 
remote states does not alter the results qualitatively. 
Since the portfolio size – as the reference against which the home bias is measured – 
could influence our findings, we calculate the home bias with several portfolio sizes 
and conduct a hypothesis test for the average home bias HBi being greater than zero 
(see figure 7). There are more than 15,000 deals for which we could find at least one 
additional hypothetical target – and even here the average home bias displayed is 447 
kilometers. 5270 portfolios with at least nine hypothetical targets could be found, 
1633 with 29 hypothetical targets, and 601 acquirers could chose between 50 or more 
potential targets – all these portfolio sizes display roughly the same average home 
bias of 447 to 674 kilometers. For all portfolio sizes the home bias is significantly 
greater than zero.   23
Figure 7 
One-sided hypothesis test 
on home bias 
The null-hypothesis H0 of the shown one-sided hypothesis 
test states that the mean of the home bias distribution equals 
zero. The alternative hypothesis postulates that the mean is 
strictly positive. As the results reveal, the null-hypothesis can 
be rejected in all cases. 
H0 :  ØHB = 0
H1 :  ØHB > 0
portfolio size n mean std. dev. t-value
> 1+1 15042 447,40 1104,78 49,67
> 9+1 5270 664,95 1219,68 39,58
> 29+1 1633 674,25 1284,77 21,21
> 49+1 601 616,50 1363,05 11,09
 
 
As stated above, four main reasons could be held responsible for the home bias in 
M&A transactions, i.e. higher synergies in connection with saving of integration 
costs, better monitoring after the deal, merging for local monopoly, and informa-
tional reasons. These reasons are not mutually exclusive and thus not easy to separate 
analytically. It should, however, be possible to distinguish informational reasons from 
those of local monopoly and integrations costs. When achieving a local monopoly – 
with arguably also the highest potential of cost savings – is the main motive for the 
observed home bias, transactions that take place within an industry should display a 
stronger home bias: Merging with similar firms nearby saves more costs and leads to 
higher local monopoly power than merging with firms farther away. On the contrary, 
if the lack of (soft) information on firms further away is the main driver of the home 
bias, merging with firms within the same industry should display less home bias: Ac-
quirer’s knowledge of the target’s business model is much higher when the target op-
erates in the same industry as the acquirer does. Spatial proximity is less important in 
assessing a firm’s value and understanding its risks and opportunities.   24
Figure 8 displays the frequency distribution of the home bias for deals where acquirer 
and target are in different industries (four-digit SIC) and the same for deals where ac-
quirers and targets are in the same industry, again for a hypothetical portfolio of at 
least 30 potential targets. Acquirers are considered to be in the same industry when 
they have either their primary or any secondary SIC in the same SIC as the target’s 
primary or secondary SICs, according to the Thomson Financial database. The upper 
graph in figure 8 shows a mean home bias of 782 kilometers (median 1046 kilome-
ters) for acquirers that diversify into new industries. This contrasts with a mean home 
bias of 589 kilometers (median 934 kilometers) for acquirers that buy firms within the 
same industry, as shown in the lower graph in figure 8. Diversifying acquirers thus 
display a much stronger home bias, which is in line with the information hypothesis. 
The mean home bias for acquisitions within an industry is 193 kilometers – or about 
one third – smaller: We conclude that it is the lack of soft information about remote 
targets that drives the home bias in M&A transactions to a large extent. Since there is 
a home bias in all transactions, both industry-internal and in diversifying transactions, 
the other hypotheses are still valid but to a smaller extent.   25
Figure 8 
Frequency distributions of home bias 
intra-industry vs. diversification 
Every histogram shows the home bias frequencies with a portfolio size of at least 29+1 
targets excluding the states AK, HI and PR. The upper graph shows a mean home bias 
of 782 km for diversifying transaction in contrast to the lower graph with a mean of 
589 km for transactions within one industry.  
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At all portfolio sizes transactions within one industry show a significantly lower 
home bias (at the 99%-level) than transactions that cross industry borders (see figure 
9). This holds true also for many individual industries (tables not reported). We con-
clude that it is mainly informational asymmetries that are responsible for the home 
bias: Acquirers that already have a good understanding of the target firm because 
they are in the same industry tend to buy firms farther away and display less home 
bias than acquirers that are buying into new business lines.   26
Figure 9 
A significant difference 
The test for equality of means shows a highly significant ine-
quality of the two means for varying portfolio sizes. As a re-
sult, transactions within one industry tend to show a signifi-
cantly smaller home bias. 
Test for Equality of Means of HB i
portfolio size > 1+1 > 9+1 > 29+1 > 49+1
t-value 4.45 5.09 3.01 2.98
 
 
When availability of information about the target is the main driver of buying deci-
sions, we would expect a declining home bias and increasing distance in the observed 
deals in time. Due to the spreading of information technology – notably the Internet 
during the 1990s – the availability of information has become ubiquitous. Petersen 
and Rajan (2002) report that bank’s distance to lenders has increased with time and 
also attribute this to information technology and the emergence of specialized data 
vendors that now help to bridge spatial distance. The same might be true for M&A 
transactions and should yield also higher distances and presumably lower home bias. 
In figure 10 we look at the development of the home bias for a minimum portfolio 
size of 30 (left column) and the total target-acquirer distance (right column) over 
time. We use a two-year moving average to smooth the graphs; the use of other aver-
ages does not change the picture much. The bias observations mostly start in 1993 
because there are too few transactions before. Each frame in figure 10 shows two 
graphs, the mean and the median of the respective time window. 
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Figure 10 
2 year moving average 
home bias and target-acquirer distance 
The figure shows the moving average of home bias as well as the target-acquirer distance TAD with a two year 
window around the date drawn [-1 ; +1]. For the home bias we use a hypothetical portfolio size of a minimum 
of 30 transactions to calculate mean and median; for TAD we use the full sample.  
 
The first row displays the home bias and the target-acquirer distance (TAD) for the 
entire sample. We find a striking reduction of the home bias from the beginning of 
the 1990s from about 1400 kilometers to a median of below 1000 kilometers at the 
end of our (moving averaged) observation data, the beginning of 2003. A reduction 
in the home bias could have two explanations: Either industry locations got more 
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dispersed over time or the target acquirer distance has gone up. We are interested 
only in the latter. The right column shows a distinct increase of the mean and median 
target acquirer distance over time, which matches the decreasing home bias quite 
well. Starting from about 500 kilometers, the median distance between target and ac-
quirer climbs up to more than 900 kilometers in 1999 and stays over 800 kilometers 
until the end of our observation period. That increase is alike when looking at the 
mean. This is in line with the information availability hypothesis and the findings of 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) for bank’s distance to lenders. The same trend is also visi-
ble when looking at intra-industry deals (SIC=SIC) in the second row and for inter-
industry deals (SIC≠SIC), third row. In line with the static findings displayed above, 
the trend for diversifying deals is decidedly stronger than for the deals within an in-
dustry. For the diversifying deals – where information asymmetries are playing a 
more important role – the decrease in the home bias is much stronger: from about 
1400 kilometers down to about 400 kilometers as opposed to about 1400 kilometers 
down to about 1000 kilometers for intra-industry deals. Equivalently, the median dis-
tance between target and acquirer went up more strongly for diversifying deals. In-
formation technology actually helps to bring information in. In the next chapter we 
examine this incident in more detail. 
IV. Drivers of home bias 
A. Methodology 
In the following section we explore the home bias phenomenon more deeply and 
identify the main drivers. We are interested in the analysis of selected firm character-
istics of the target and in general transaction characteristics regarding information 
flows. We set up a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the home 
bias HBi, i.e. the deviation of the observed transaction distance from the mean dis-
tance to each potential target, measured in kilometers. For example, if an acquirer 
shows an HBi of 300 kilometers it chooses to buy a company that is 300 kilometers 
closer than the mean of all other potential targets. The theoretical interval of HBi   29
ranges from minus to plus 4700 kilometers which is determined by the absolute 
maximum in our sample – the coast-to-coast distance.  
The coefficient of each regressor shows the impact of the variables for the explana-
tion of acquirers’ proximity preferences. Each linear coefficient serves as an indicator 
for the percentage change of home bias when the variable is increased by one per-
cent. For simplicity we use the ordinary least squares estimate for the following linear 
regressions. Due to volatile variances in the residuals we correct with the heterosce-
dastic consistent variance-covariance matrix of White. As above – in the regression to 
explain the distance between the transaction partners – we include the log of the tar-
get’s market value, the financial leverage, the return on assets as well as the price to 
book ratio in our analysis. Thus, the following regression model evolves: 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = 0 4 3 2 1 ) P/B RoA erage Lev ln(MV HB  
The following tables show the results of the linear regressions with a potential port-
folio size of at least 1+1 companies. The results stay robust if we exclude small port-
folio sizes (e.g. only regard portfolio sizes larger than 1+9). Although there is less dis-
tortion within large portfolios, we do not assume that possible mismatches (e.g. due 
to wrong SIC codification) are spatially aiming in one direction in small samples and 
therefore include all portfolio sizes. 
As before, the full sample is then divided into sub-samples for different firm sizes. 
The smallest category builds the nano caps with a market capitalization of up to 50 
million US dollars. The second frame contains the micro caps with at least 50 to 300 
million and is followed by the small caps with up to 2 billion dollars. The second 
largest category includes the mid caps with a market capitalization between 2 and 10 
billion dollars. As the last category the large caps embrace enterprises of up to 200 
billion dollars. Then we divide the full sample into two time segments with the first 
running from 1990 to 1997 and the second from 1998 until the first quarter of 2004. 
To complete the analysis we distinguish transactions that take place within one indus-
try (SIC=SIC) from acquisitions that buy into new industries (SIC ≠ SIC).   30
The full sample consists of n = 2186 observations. Considering the total number of 
M&A transactions the sample size appears to be rather small. This is due to the fact 
that the regression includes only deals where all variables are known. As in the major-
ity of M&A activity at least one side involves private small and medium sized enter-
prises there is very poor data availability especially on accounting data (e.g. leverage, 
RoA, P/B Ratio). 
B. Regression results 
Figure 11 shows the results of the multivariate regression of the target’s firm charac-
teristics on the home bias. Both, company size and leverage are statistically and eco-
nomically significant in the full sample regression. Acquirers of large companies have 
a lower proximity preference with a t-value of t ln(MV) = -6.28, i.e. a significance level 
of 99 percent. That result is robust throughout an additive generation of the regres-
sion equation (table not reported). The coefficient's interpretation of a log variable 
describes the average proportional change (in hundred) of the endogenous variable, 
with a one per cent change of the exogenous variable. A β ln(MV) of -92.70 therefore 
shows an average decrease in home bias of 0.927 per cent if the log of market value is 
increased by one per cent. The significant negative influence is consistent with both 
the results of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) who find a similar investment behavior of 
US funds managers as well as Kang and Stulz (1997) who find similar results for for-
eign investors in Japan. 
The next firm characteristic, leverage, is an indicator for the financial distress of the 
target company. Again the results in figure 11 show a highly significant coefficient β 
Lev = 677.35 at a 99 percent level: The higher the leverage of a target the stronger the 
home bias of an acquirer. Quantitatively spoken, a one percent increase in leverage 
leads to an increase of the home bias of 6.77 kilometers. Again, this is similar to the 
results of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that US fund managers have a preference 
for highly levered companies located nearby. Also, a strong analogy to the results of 
Kang and Stulz (1997) persists which we will point out in the following sections. 
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Figure 11 
Multivariate regression (firm characteristics) 
The dependent variable in this regression is the home bias HBi. The main sample contains all M&A transactions 
with a portfolio size of at least 1+1 companies that provide data for all regressors (n = 2186). The exogenous 
variables consist primarily of target characteristics being the log of market value ln(MV), leverage, Return-on-
Assets RoA, Price-to-Book Ratio P/B. The sample is being divided into sub samples for the target size, time win-
dow and industry internal transactions SIC=SIC versus deals that aim into a new industry SIC≠SIC. 
Sample ln(MV) Lev RoA P/B C n R²
All -92.70 677.35 3.168 -1.103 491.95 2186 0.056
-(6.28) (7.89) (1.92) -(1.78) (5.15)
Nano Cap 635.38 3.47 -0.166 201.509 759 0.042
(4.42) (1.64) -(0.51) (1.86)
Micro Cap 715.02 0.450 -0.969 117.22 940 0.038
(5.82) (0.15) -(1.74) (1.30)
Small Cap 687.03 4.136 -1.482 -212.77 392 0.033
(3.01) (0.82) -(1.16) -1.35
Mid Cap 635.35 21.953 -13.293 -349.16 82 0.131
(1.53) (1.54) -(0.71) -1.17
Large Cap 2519.31 90.404 -38.265 -2029.36 13 0.117
(1.14) (1.37) -(0.22) -1.31
1990 to 1997 -86.58 763.98 10.354 -0.372 387.18 867 0.072
-(3.98) (6.02) (3.53) -(1.77) (3.00)
1998 to Q1/04 -91.07 685.14 1.088 -7.199 502.29 1319 0.059
-(4.54) (5.83) (0.55) -(2.81) (3.73)
SIC = SIC -67.88 526.93 2.937 -1.314 422.80 1230 0.032
-(3.46) (4.34) (1.27) -(1.28) (3.23)
SIC = SIC -69.58 655.18 12.282 -0.547 314.17 491 0.057
1990 to 1997 -(2.46) (3.65) (3.30) -(2.11) (1.85)
SIC = SIC -63.64 532.29 0.652 -5.758 424.06 739 0.033
1998 to Q1/04 -(2.32) (3.19) (0.23) -(2.25) (2.21)
SIC ≠ SIC -122.95 837.10 3.094 -0.983 571.12 956 0.092
-(5.20) (7.02) (1.44) -(1.44) (4.10)
SIC ≠ SIC -91.78 850.37 7.676 -0.420 429.82 376 0.087
1990 to 1997 -(2.54) (4.71) (1.72) -(1.14) (2.15)
SIC ≠ SIC -124.56 863.95 0.764 -14.434 590.87 580 0.105
1998 to Q1/04 -(4.12) (5.38) (0.31) -(4.72) (3.20)
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While the target’s RoA is significant in the comprising regression, it shows little sig-
nificance in the regressions separated by firm size as well as in most additive regres-
sion analyses (not reported here). On top of that, the industry specific analysis reveals 
both positive as well as negative slope coefficients. Altogether, there is no definite 
picture of the influence of RoA on the acquirer's home bias. Slightly opposing our 
findings, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) point to a weak but significant negative influ-
ence on the fund manager’s home bias. They conclude ‘that investors favor local 
firms with relatively poor accounting performance. However, this preference is not 
manifested in an economically important way’ (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, p. 2064). 
In our findings the P/B ratio is statistically significant in the full sample but not the 
industrial specific regressions (not shown here). 
Since the size of target companies might affect the merging patterns that are ob-
scured in the general picture, we divide our set into several sub-samples. The majority 
of M&A transactions takes place within the micro (n=940) and nano-cap (n=759) 
segment, where almost all private companies are placed. The large cap segment has 
too little observations for statistically significant findings and is mentioned here for 
informational reasons only. Figure 11 shows that the significance of leverage de-
creases with business size and is not significant in the mid cap segment or larger. This 
result is in line with the information hypothesis: For assessing highly indebted small 
firms spatial proximity is helpful; it is however not needed for the large caps since 
those are more transparent. The RoA and P/B-ratio are not consistently significant. 
RoA has the expected positive sign when significant; a high return on assets charac-
terizes a profitable, opaque firm where presumably important assets are not recorded 
in the balance sheet. The higher the RoA, the more home bias could be observed – 
i.e., in the small- and mid-cap sector only. The P/B ratio is significant with a negative 
sign only in the micro cap sector: A high price-book ratio decreases the home bias. 
This is not in line with an information hypothesis with similar reasoning as before. 
That could be due to the strong explanatory power of the leverage variable, with also 
captures firm distress and thus opaqueness (see Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Fama 
and French 1992).    33
We differentiate also between M&A transactions within one industry on a four-digit 
SIC level (SIC=SIC) from diversifying transactions (SIC≠SIC). For the most part, 
the coefficients and levels of significance remain largely unchanged. However, the 
coefficient for the size of the firm ln(MV) exerts a much stronger influence on the 
home bias in diversifying transactions. When buying into a new industry, acquirers 
react more to the size of the target (with a coefficient of -122.95 as opposed to -67.88 
in industry-internal transactions). This is also in line with a story about information 
problems: Small firms in other industries are harder to evaluate than firms in a 
known industry, so size does matter more in diversifying transactions. Accordingly, in 
those transactions the coefficient for the leverage variable is larger. 
The most striking changes occur when we split up the results in time. We create two 
sub-samples with transactions from 1990 to 1997 and from 1998 until the first quar-
ter of 2004, the end of our dataset. The second half covers roughly two thirds of all 
transactions (n=1319). Both, the coefficient of the firm size ln(MV) and its signifi-
cance slightly increase in the second period. Firm size plays a bigger role after 1997 in 
explaining the variance of the home bias. Many of the findings for the two different 
periods are confirmed when we split the data into industry-internal and diversifying 
transactions within each time period. The leverage variable remains with a large posi-
tive coefficient and highly significant in all four sub-samples, and the price-book ratio 
mostly is significant and has a negative sign. The return-on-assets has always a posi-
tive sign, as expected, and is significant in about half the regressions. Firm size has 
about the same negative and significant coefficient in both periods, although the sub-
samples display a slightly lower t-value. The same is also true for transactions cross-
ing industries.  
Since we pool our data across industries, industry-specific characteristics may distort 
our findings. As a robustness check we run the same linear regression model with in-
dustry-normalized variables. The annual industry-specific means of each variable are 
calculated from the Compustat database. We divide each value by its corresponding 
industry mean. In some industries there have been only few observations in some 
years. Therefore we run two checks, one in which we include all observations and 
one in which we only include industries with at least 30 observations per variable per   34
year. Both tests lead to very similar results, so the latter is not reported here. The re-
sults are shown in figure 12. The demeaned model shows qualitatively the same re-
sults as the one without normalization, except for the RoA variable that turns nega-
tive but is not at all significant. In general, significance levels are slightly lower. Still, 
market value shows a significant negative impact. The information hypothesis – 
measured by RoA and P/B variables – is thus not confirmed in the industry-
normalized regressions. The market value, however, is still significant with the ex-
pected sign. The financial leverage has mainly positive coefficients, some significant. 
Only for intra-industry transactions there are negative but insignificant coefficients 
for leverage as opposed to positive and significant coefficients in the inter-industry 
fraction. This is in line with the information hypothesis: For acquiring firms that buy 
within their industry, targets’ financial leverage does not play a role for the home bias. 
Firms that venture into new business lines across industries need more information 
and buy highly leveraged target firms only when they are in close distance.  
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Figure 12 
Industry-normalized multivariate regression 
The dependent variable in this regression is the home bias HBi. The main sample contains all M&A transactions 
with a portfolio size of at least 1+1 companies that provide data for all regressors (n = 1556). The exogenous 
variables consist of industry-normalized target characteristics market value MV, leverage, Return-on-Assets RoA 
and Price-to-Book Ratio P/B. Each firm-variable is divided by its annual industry-specific mean. The sample is 
being divided into sub samples for the target size, time window and industry internal transactions SIC=SIC ver-
sus deals that aim into a new industry SIC≠SIC. 
Sample MV Lev RoA P/B C n R²
All -67.06 128.23 -1.067 -3.582 297.23 1556 0.009
-(2.92) (1.49) -(0.48) -(1.70) (3.92)
Nano Cap 64.34 -0.95 6.924 383.671 488 0.001
(0.45) -(0.11) (0.90) (2.92)
Micro Cap 56.28 -0.499 -2.029 404.71 679 0.001
(0.44) -(0.22) -(0.74) (3.76)
Small Cap 331.49 14.357 -4.219 -125.37 314 0.013
(1.50) (0.41) -(1.08) -0.66
Mid Cap 266.36 -101.272 -71.936 -187.93 65 0.105
(0.70) -(1.72) -(1.18) -0.51
Large Cap -46.01 -292.539 113.999 -491.35 10 0.223
-(0.03) -(0.44) (1.06) -0.42
1990 to 1997 -23.54 191.33 -1.784 0.084 245.02 522 0.004
-(0.70) (1.29) -(0.25) (0.12) (1.88)
1998 to Q1/04 -90.13 100.54 -0.660 -10.871 321.61 1034 0.018
-(2.87) (0.95) -(0.31) -(2.79) (3.45)
SIC = SIC -47.24 -142.59 -1.201 -2.846 395.01 872 0.006
-(1.59) -(1.20) -(0.37) -(1.29) (3.97)
SIC = SIC -12.51 -66.33 -0.093 -0.178 295.65 299 0.001
1990 to 1997 -(0.31) -(0.33) -(0.02) -(0.25) (1.77)
SIC = SIC -85.32 -165.06 -1.651 -7.992 444.24 573 0.012
1998 to Q1/04 -(1.94) -(1.11) -(0.45) -(1.55) (3.56)
SIC ≠ SIC -87.30 416.66 -3.339 -4.691 193.42 684 0.032
-(2.39) (3.33) -(1.47) -(1.58) (1.67)
SIC ≠ SIC -24.72 374.78 -13.198 -0.812 272.11 223 0.016
1990 to 1997 -(0.37) (1.60) -(0.59) -(0.52) (1.26)
SIC ≠ SIC -98.03 397.99 -2.276 -12.447 177.14 461 0.044
1998 to Q1/04 -(2.26) (2.69) -(1.33) -(2.32) (1.29)
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V. Economic Significance 
A. Data and methodology 
The home bias is a quite stable empirical phenomenon in domestic M&A transac-
tions and is backed by a variety of theoretical arguments. Savings in transportation 
and integration costs, easier monitoring of the new subsidy and superior information 
availability about firms close by should be reflected in the reaction of capital markets 
around merger announcement. We conduct a short-term event study of the weighted 
total stock price reactions of acquirer and target within a three-day window [-1; +1] 
around announcement date of the respective transactions, implying relatively efficient 
capital markets. While undoubtedly there are reactions before and presumably after-
wards, the three-day window is commonly used in merger studies (see Andrade et al., 
2001, for an overview).  
In this study, we use the same dataset as before and complement it with daily share 
prices from the CRSP database. Since capital market reactions from both, acquirer 
and target are needed our sample decreases to 1758 M&A deals from 1990 to the first 
quarter of 2004. The large reduction is mainly due to the fact that most transactions 
recorded by SDC Thomson Financial involve at least one private firm and thus are 
not eligible. Additionally, we exclude from the analysis any transaction that involves 
the acquisition of less than 50 percent of the target company. As before, we do not 
distinguish between mergers and acquisitions. The total success of a transaction is 
measured as the three-day abnormal return of acquirer and target weighted by their 
respective market capitalizations two trading days before announcement date. The 
expected normal return is calculated by the CAPM, with the daily beta taken from a 
period [-250;-50] trading days against the CRSP all share index, which is also used as 
benchmark index during the event. On average, targets gain about 21.6% during the 
three day window, acquirers lose about 1.5%, and the average total abnormal return 
for target and acquirer combined is 1.0%, roughly in line with the Andrade et al. 2001 
results and others. Since we consider only deals where both, acquirer and target are   37
listed companies the results for acquirers are slightly worse than reported in other 
studies. 
The frames in figure 13 report the success of M&A transactions measured by the 
cumulated abnormal return in a three-day window [-1;+1] around announcement 
date. The graphs in figure 13 show the data as a 12-month moving average [-6 
months; +6 months]. In each frame, the success for all deals, the success for deals 
within one industry (SIC=SIC) and for diversifying deals (SIC≠SIC) are displayed. 
The total success of M&A transactions decreases during our observation period. Es-
pecially the mean total success of transactions within one industry (SIC=SIC) reveals 
a strong movement from roughly +3.5 percent in the first half of the nineties to 
around zero. 
The targets’ abnormal returns are firmly positive during the whole period. The U-
shaped graph of mean and median reveal a slight but steady upward movement from 
1992 onwards. In contrast, acquirers’ success (mean and median) show a downward 
movement through the whole observation period. Starting from a mean of around 
zero percent abnormal return (i.e. 100% or 1.0 of market capitalization two days be-
fore announcement) in 1990 the median acquirer success hardly shows positive re-
sults over the entire period. In total, acquirers’ share prices show a positive return in 
only 40 percent of all transactions.    38
Figure 13 
Mean and median abnormal return  
This table reports the success of M&A transactions measured by the cumulated abnormal return in a three-day win-
dow [-1;+1] around announcement date. The total success is computed by the abnormal returns of target and acquirer 
weighted by their market capitalization. The graphs below show the data with a moving average of +6 and -6 months. 
In each frame, the success for all deals, the success for deals within one industry (SIC=SIC) and for diversifying deals 
(SIC ≠ SIC) are displayed. The vertical axis shows the market capitalization one day after the announcement relative 
to the combined market capitalization two days before the announcement date. 
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In general, M&A deals involve a lot of idiosyncrasy with a few stylized facts emerg-
ing from the data: On average, the total success measured by differences in the 
weighted share price of acquirer and target is modestly positive. However, more is 
happening beneath. Whereas the acquirer does not gain much if at all, the target’s 
share price – usually a smaller firm – increases a lot. Diversifying deals are less suc-
cessful than transactions within one industry. The terms of payments are important, 
i.e. cash payments are more successful than hybrid payments and paying for the ac-
quisitions with shares only usually means a drop in share prices for the acquirer. 
Tender offers and leveraged transactions tend to be more successful than others, as 
is buying large firms. To our knowledge the influence of distance in domestic M&A 
transactions has not been tested so far. 
We are using the above mentioned stylized facts about the success of M&A trans-
actions as control variables. Thus, we expect the cumulated abnormal returns to be 
correlated with home bias, market value of the target, leverage, whether the transac-
tion is a leveraged buyout, and the payment method (only cash, only shares, hybrid 
payment). The basic model specification is given by: 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = 0 , 4 3 2 1 j jDummy Leverage ln(MV) BIAS CAR  
Where CAR refers to the cumulative abnormal return in percent; β0 is the inter-
cept; home bias, ln(MV) and leverage have the same specifications as in the regres-
sions before. We use five different binary variables as separate dummies for the in-
dication of specific transaction characteristics: For deals that were highly debt fi-
nanced (indication taken from the Thomson Financial data set) the dummy lbo 
takes the value of 1. For deals where a tender offer was launched for the target the 
dummy tender takes the value of 1. And finally, to control for the way of payment 
we use the dummies cash, shares, hybrid representing the corresponding type.   40
B. Regression results 
The first section of figure 14 shows the results for the whole dataset. Our study re-
produces the general findings in the literature quite well: The extended use of debt 
financing of the acquisition (lbo) increases the success, as do tender offers and pay-
ment with cash. Payment of target shareholders by shares only reduces the total 
success; hybrid payments (both cash and shares) are not significant. The size of the 
firm, measured by the log of the market value ln(MV), has a negative sign and is 
highly significant – the larger the target, the less successful the transaction. The 
same holds true for leverage, the more leveraged the target, the less successful the 
transaction. As displayed in the lower parts of figure 14, the results remain qualita-
tively unchanged between deals within an industry (SIC=SIC) and across industries 
(SIC≠SIC), although most coefficients are lower and less significant in the latter 
case (with the exception of market value). 
We are most interested, however, in the home bias coefficient, which in the full 
sample is showing a positive sign throughout the specifications and is mostly sig-
nificant with t-values ranging from 1.20 to 1.87: The more distinctive the acquirer’s 
home bias, the better the success of the deal measured by the abnormal returns 
around announcement. The coefficient is close to zero and thus the influence of 
distance is in general not economically relevant: A stronger home bias does not 
change the combined abnormal return of both participants a lot – which is surpris-
ing. We get qualitatively unchanged results when regressing with the target-acquirer 
distance instead of home bias (table not reported). This underscores the above 
findings: Merging with a firm closer by does on average not improve the results. 
For example, an increase in home bias of 100 kilometers only results in a 0.0229 
percent higher cumulated abnormal return. Most of the theoretical arguments men-
tioned in the beginning – less integration costs, local monopoly power, better 
monitoring afterwards – do not lead to higher pay offs for shareholders of the 
combined firm!  
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C. Time 
To test whether the observed phenomena are stable in time we split the sample into 
two sub-samples, again an early phase from 1990 to 1997 and a later phase from 1998 
to the first quarter of 2004 (see figure 15). Without changing qualitatively, most con-
trol variable coefficients are lower and show also lower – but predominantly still sig-
nificant – t-values in the early phase. Surprisingly, both market value and home bias 
are not significant drivers of success in the early phase. While market value looses its 
significance but still has the expected negative sign, the home bias coefficient be-
comes even negative, but not significant. Proximity as a driver of success became im-
portant only in the later phase, starting in 1998. Recall that during the observation 
period the home bias went down while, at the same time, the average distance be-
tween target and acquirer increased significantly. From these two observations the 
following picture emerges: During the early phase, when home bias is high and the 
average distance to the target is low anyway, distance does not yield significant ex-
planatory power for the success of M&A transactions. In the later phase, however, 
with a strongly decreasing home bias and strongly increasing distances to the targets, 
the home bias variable becomes significant. The home bias becomes more important 
when distances are large. The stronger the home bias, the more successful the deal. 
Since proximity never becomes an economically relevant factor, we do not pursue the 
analysis further at this point. This is however, an important hint for future research.  
In the full sample, home bias is not an important driver of the success of an M&A 
transaction (neither is distance, the results are not reported here). This is, in fact, 
puzzling: Although many theoretical arguments are in favor of better results for 
proximate transactions, this is not reflected in our event study. The main reason for 
choosing proximate targets may just be a familiarity argument along the lines of 
Huberman (2001). Managers are predominantly more familiar with firms close by – 
but that does not necessarily mean that they have better information about them. In-
deed, if the theoretical arguments above would hold (and we cannot rule this out), i.e. 
lower integration costs, better monitoring afterwards and local monopoly in the case 
of proximate targets, there seems to be almost an adverse selection process: Since   44
success is influenced only to a very small extent by the distance between the partners, 
acquirers might miss the best opportunities by predominantly choosing firms that are 
located close by.  
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D. Best and worst deciles 
Do the results so far mean that distance does not play an important role for the suc-
cess of M&A transactions at all? To see whether distance has an impact, we compare 
the most successful (again in terms of combined abnormal return for buyer and tar-
get) ten percent of the deals with the lowest ten percent. This comparison yields 
some interesting results (see figure 16), which are also visible – though less pro-
nounced – when comparing the highest quartile with the lowest one (not reported).  
Figure 16 
Best and worst deciles 
To see whether distance has an impact, we compare the most successful (again in terms of combined 
abnormal return for buyer and target) ten percent of the deals with the lowest ten percent with regard 
to their respective average distances and home biases. This comparison yields some interesting results, 
which are also visible – though less pronounced – when comparing the highest quartile with the lowest 
one (not reported). 
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Total abnor-
mal return, 
mean 
13.6% -11.6% 14.5% -12.5% 12.2% -10.1% 
Distance, 
mean  1136 1740 1169 1777 1166 1721 
Distance, 
median  588 1412 682 1516 439 1412 
Home bias, 
mean  421 51 369  -122  476 268 
Home bias, 
median  437 160 361  66  565 343   47
The mean total abnormal return – reported in the first row – for the best performing 
10 percent (116 firms in our sample) is 13.6%, compared to -11.6% for the worst ten 
percent. When looking only at deals within one industry (SIC=SIC), the returns of 
the best decile are slightly higher (14.5%) and of the lowest slightly lower (-12.5%). 
Not surprisingly, the average abnormal return in the best diversifying deals is lower at 
12.2%; however, the worst decile of diversifying deals is performing better than the 
others at -10.1%.  
The median distance of the best performing deals is 588 kilometers, as opposed to 
the median 1412 kilometers of the worst performing deals. The difference is less dis-
tinct when looking at the respective means (1136 vs. 1740) but still visible. Clearly, 
the best performing deals have a lower distance between acquirer and target than the 
worst performing deals. However, it is not only the distance that matters – in that 
case we would conclude that it’s indeed mainly post-transaction costs or the building 
of local monopolies that are responsible for the better results. Also, the home bias is 
strikingly higher in the group of the best performing deals, with a median home bias 
of 437 kilometers (mean 421) in contrast to a small home bias of 160 kilometers 
(mean 51) in the worst performing group. While the best performing firms chose on 
average target firms that were 421 kilometers closer to them than other possible tar-
gets, in the badly performing transactions acquirers chose target firms that had about 
the average distance to them as their respective portfolios of possible targets. We take 
this as evidence that information availability is better for firms closer by and that it 
might indeed transform into better deals.  
When comparing the best deals where acquirer and target are in the same industry 
(column 2) with those where they are in different industries (column 3), the differ-
ence in the median distances stand out: The best deals within one industry show a 
median distance of 682 kilometers whereas the best deals in diversifying deals show a 
median distance of only 439 kilometers. This corresponds with a smaller median 
home bias in deals within an industry of 361 kilometers compared to 565 kilometers 
in diversifying deals: When crossing industry borders, the best performing deals dis-
play a lower distance between acquirer and target and a larger home bias. This again   48
is in line with the information availability hypothesis as acquirers that have knowl-
edge from operating in the same industry as the target do need less tacit information 
about the target for assessment; distance is less important in these cases. A stronger 
home bias (and slightly lower distances) is also observed when comparing the worst 
performing deals crossing industries to those within one industry. In the former, a 
median home bias of 343 kilometers is observed (as opposed to 66 kilometers in 
deals within one industry). We interpret this again as a manifestation of differences in 
information availability; however, choosing targets closer by than the average target 
seems to be merely a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. 
VI. Conclusion 
Using data of US domestic mergers and acquisitions transactions, this paper shows 
that acquirers have a preference for geographically proximate target companies. We 
measure the ‘home bias’ against benchmark portfolios of hypothetical deals where 
the potential targets consist of firms of similar size in the same four-digit SIC code 
that have been targets in other transactions at about the same time or firms that have 
been listed at a stock exchange at that time. There is a strong and consistent home 
bias for M&A transactions in the US, which is significantly declining during the ob-
servation period, i.e. between 1990 and 2004. At the same time, the average distances 
between target and acquirer increase articulately. The home bias is stronger for small 
and relatively opaque target companies suggesting that local information is the deci-
sive factor in explaining the results. Acquirers that diversify into new business lines 
also display a stronger preference for more proximate targets. With an event study we 
show that investors react relatively better to proximate acquisitions than to distant 
ones. That reaction is more important and becomes significant in times when the av-
erage distance between target and acquirer becomes larger, but never becomes eco-
nomically significant. We interpret this as evidence for the familiarity hypothesis 
brought forward by Huberman (2001): Acquirers know about the existence of 
proximate targets and are more likely to merge with them without necessarily being 
better informed. However, when comparing the best and the worst deals, we are able   49
to show a dramatic difference in distances and home bias: The most successful deals 
display on average a much stronger home bias and distinctively smaller distance be-
tween acquirer and target than the least successful deals. Proximity in M&A transac-
tions therefore is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. The paper con-
tributes to the growing literature on the role of distance in financial decisions. 
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